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I.  Introduction 
In 2000, as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) was about to deliver its 
new rules regarding ergonomics standards, the United Parcel Service (UPS) mobilized into action.  For 10 
years UPS had vociferously opposed the development of rules regarding these standards for business, 
arguing that it is difficult to make uniform ergonomic rules for diverse production and business processes.  
This fight at OSHA had included tens of thousands of pages of evidence, data, and detailed commentary.  
Simultaneously, UPS had waged a war on the potential regulations in Congress.  UPS had contributed to 
legislator campaigns, becoming one of the largest political action committee (PAC) contributors to federal 
candidates.  In addition, the company spent millions of dollars lobbying (providing information to) 
legislators. Concurrent with all of these actions, UPS unleashed a brigade of attorneys to fight the 
proposed regulations in the U.S. Federal Courts.  By early 2001, UPS and the business lobby prevailed—
in Congress.  They successfully lobbied Congress to pass legislation that halted the implementation of 
any OSHA ergonomic standards. 
Every year, the U.S. government establishes thousands of laws, rules, and regulations that affect 
the competitive landscape.  Indeed, in many ways, these rules are the competitive landscape on which 
firms compete.  Traditional competitive strategy tools have dedicated themselves to analyzing how firms 
gain competitive advantage in markets.  Whether industry-driven, resource-based, technology-focused or 
network-centric, the tools and theories of strategic management focus on how firms gain competitive 
advantage over their rivals when the landscape is exogenously given. 
Non-market strategy, however, assumes that this landscape for pricing, investment, and 
competition decisions is not exogenous.  Rather, it explicitly considers the landscape as endogenous—a 
landscape that a firm can affect with various tools at its disposal.  This landscape can be created, tilted, or 
altered to give one firm the high ground and another firm the low ground (Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976,   1
Becker 1983).  One way to do this is through corporate political strategy.  Corporate political strategy 
addresses how a firm interacts with political institutions to change the competitive landscape and obtain 
competitive advantage.
1   
This is a growing area in strategic management.  Legal and acceptable competitive behavior is 
determined endogenously by legislators, regulators and judges who are influenced, positively and 
negatively, by the very same firms the regulations are designed to control.  By understanding the theories 
of how firms affect politics, one can better determine how to gain competitive advantage through political 
institutions.  This is a natural extension of the traditional tools of strategic management.  Moreover, for 
young scholars, this is an area in which the lines of investigation are clear and the openings for serious 
research opportunities available.  In this sense, it is robust area for future research and major contributions 
to understanding firm performance. 
This paper begins by providing an organizing framework for thinking about corporate political 
strategy and firm profitability.  It then provides an overview of the work that has been done in the area 
and highlights the open research areas and research questions that scholars might examine going forward.  
Some concluding thoughts are provided at the end. 
 
II. A Framework for Integrated Political Strategy 
  In the United States, and almost every democratic country in the world, there are three primary 
levels of policy-making:  legislatures, agencies, and courts.  The organizing framework begins with these 
three institutions. 
The legislature is charged with creating statutes that govern society.  Given its wide latitude in 
creating rules, the legislature can create laws that affect a range of economic activity.  The first way the 
legislature affects economic activity is through its own participation in the buyer-supplier relationship. 
The legislature has the power to tax and use those monies for transfers or procurement.  In the United 
States, the federal government budget is $3.1 trillion (Executive Office of the President, 2008). As such, 
                                                 
1 Some have suggested this is merely raising rival’s costs (Salop and Scheffman 1983), but as will be evident from   2
the Congress can allocate resources through the taxation, budgeting, and appropriations process, to 
substantially affect the composition of economic activity.  For firms, this means that the governmental 
allocation of monies can affect the profitability of not only the industry in which the firm competes, but it 
may also have particularized benefits to the firm itself, as in the allocation of money to certain firms for 
goods and services provided (fighter jets, roads, information technology systems).  
Perhaps a more powerful mechanism by which the legislature affects firms is through the 
regulation of specific economic activities.  In nearly every area of the economy, Congress has the ability 
to create legislation that determines the rules by which companies compete.  These include antitrust 
regulations, intellectual property rules, and safety rules.  In addition, the legislature creates numerous 
industry-specific regulations in telecommunications, energy, banking, and health care, to name just a few.   
Because legislatures have such wide latitude in creating laws, they are expertise- and time-
constrained in detailing and implementing the rules.  Thus, legislators often delegate the details of rule-
making to a second institution, administrative agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Indeed, there are over 100 government 
agencies in the U.S. that are charged with implementing rules.  Although only Congress can create 
statutes, these administrative agencies can create rules, regulations, and findings, through various 
procedures, with the “force of law” (Strauss et al, 1995: Chapter 1).  Every year, each agency creates 
thousands of rules and makes thousands of determinations that have a significant impact on business (de 
Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001).  Verizon cannot enter certain markets without the permission of the FCC.  
General Electric must obtain a ruling from the SEC or IRS to make certain financial accounting and 
disclosure changes.  Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) must obtain permits from the EPA before it can 
construct a new power plant.  The ability of agencies to engage in rulemaking and adjudication makes 
agencies perhaps the most intrusive, if not important, governmental player in the day-to-day operations of 
firms.  
                                                                                                                                                             
this literature, integrated political strategies go far beyond this phenomenon.   3
A final rule-making body is the courts.  Businesses and interest groups that are dissatisfied 
with an administrative agency’s rules can choose to challenge those rules in courts.  Courts have 
shown a willingness to overturn agencies (Schuck and Elliott 1990) and in many cases, create new 
policies that affect business.  Although courts have not traditionally been thought of as a “policy-
making” branch of government, it is clear they engage in this activity.  Courts determined that foremen 
are workers and not management, and thus eligible to unionize and engage in collective bargaining 
(Bell Aerospace Co, v. NLRB, 1974); courts intervene in the making of environmental policy and the 
emission of stationary sources of pollution (Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 1984); and 
courts put their stamp on tariff rates and product classifications (U.S. v. Mead 2001). Courts, through 
their ability to overturn agencies, and their proclivity to create new policy, can have a large impact in 
the rules that affect business.  
Given that legislatures, agencies, and courts are the governmental actors, we now must 
understand two additional aspects to the policy-making process to make sense of the way these actors 
pursue policy: the order of action and the role of interest groups.
2  The first important aspect to policy-
making is the order of action.  Congress generally moves first, setting up broad legislation, which 
provides a general guide for business activity. Congress then delegates authority to agencies to implement 
the guidelines.  Administrative agencies, with accumulated experience in the field, then enact regulations 
under the watchful oversight of Congress.  Firms and interest groups that dislike the rulings can choose to 
challenge the agency’s ruling in court.  In general, the policy-making actors act sequentially.
3 
A second important aspect to policy-making is that it does not happen in a vacuum.  Interest 
groups such as firms and unions constantly try to influence the outcome of policy. Just as firms compete 
in the market, they also compete in the political arena, attempting to influence the outcome of the rules of 
market competition to enhance their profitability.  One way firms pursue profit is through market 
competition, such as the introduction of new products or pursuit of certain pricing or acquisition 
                                                 
2 We discuss the utility function of these political actors in the next section. 
3 The different government institutions do not necessarily have to act sequentially, but frequently they act in the 
manner described in this paper.     4
strategies.  A second way firms pursue profits is through the political sphere, winning the non-market 
competition in the political arena so that political actors create rules which enhance the profitability of the 
firm either directly (through subsidies, tax breaks, and the like) or indirectly (through the creation of 
regulations which will enhance the profitability of the firm).  This is the essence of nonmarket strategy 
(Baron 2002, Spulber 1994).  
Figure 1 illustrates a framework for nonmarket strategy.  The top of the figure has the interests 
groups that provide inputs into the political sphere.  The inputs come in two main forms—money and 
information.  This money and information is provided to the three main political actors who deliver rules 
and policies:  legislatures, agencies, and courts.  These actors are placed in the sequential order in which 
they can deliver rules, with the legislature first, the administrative agency second, and the courts third.  In 
turn, these actors create policy.  These policies become the “rules of the game” that firms compete under.  
Thus, in each political forum, the firms compete to obtain policy.   
 
***INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE***  
 
Figure 1 illustrates three main ideas.  The first is policy-making is generally, but not always, 
sequential across political institutions.  Second, there are multiple forums in which firms and interest 
groups can create and block policy.  Finally, firms compete in two markets, the product market and the 
political market.  We call the unified non-market and market strategies the integrated strategies of the 
firm.  With this as the general framework, an analysis of the political strategy of firms can be completed.  
 
III. Instruments of Political Strategy 
  In each forum, the two main instruments at the disposal of firms to influence policy-making are 
money and information.  The use of these instruments is integral to the strategy of the firm because 
politicians and policy-makers are responsive to these instruments.  Just as investments are made by firms 
in plant, equipment, and brands, so, too, are investments made by firms in money and information to 
affect the political landscape (Snyder 1990, 1992).  Frequently, very senior executives are involved in this   5
investment process.  In this section, we consider the role, influence, and effectiveness of money and 
information in each institution.   
 
A.  Legislatures   
1.  Money 
  A legal form of money transfers from firms to legislators comes in the form of campaign 
contributions.
 4  Candidates require money to run their (re)election campaigns.  While some money may 
come from the State and other money from individuals, in many countries, money contributions from 
firms and other interest groups is permissible.  There is a substantial debate in the literature as to the 
effect of this money.  The most common theoretical models view these transfers as having the same effect 
as bribes.  In most of the “vote-buying” models, firms, unions, and industry associations contribute 
money to legislators to change the vote, or “buy the vote,” of the legislator on a particular bill (e.g. 
Snyder 1991, Grossman and Helpman 1994, Groseclose and Snyder 1996, Besley and Coate 2001).   
Empirical work on vote buying is mixed.  There have been dozens of papers in economics and 
political science that have attempted to estimate the effect of (PAC) campaign contributions on votes.  
The prevalent empirical view until about five years ago was that money transfers significantly influenced 
vote outcomes.  (See, for example, Stratmann 1992, 1998, Goldberg and Maggi 1998).  However, 
Ansolabehere et al (2003) conducted a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature on vote-
buying, summarizing the results of all empirical papers in economics written during the previous 30 
years.  They highlight that a systematic problem in the empirical literature is that many papers that 
conduct econometric tests of vote-buying are misspecified.  The traditional approach in these papers is to 
use the legislator’s vote as the left hand side variable and campaign contributions on the right hand side, 
interpreting the coefficient on contributions as the effect of interest group money on legislator voting 
                                                 
4 Money transfers between firms and legislators can occur illegally and legally.  Illegal transfers of money, 
undisclosed cash transfers from firms to legislators in exchange for favors and a quid pro quo, are generally 
considered bribes.  These favors could be votes, legislation, oversight of regulatory agencies, or other benefits.  The 
study of explicit bribes, which are often associated with governmental corruption, is outside the scope of this paper.
   6
behavior.  The problem with this approach, however, is that contributions are not randomly given; rather 
they are passed out strategically by firms.  This means econometrically that the contributions are 
correlated with the error term in the regression resulting in biased parameter estimates.  To solve this 
problem they suggest one should find a natural experiment or use instrumental variables.  Ansolabehere et 
al (2003) use the instrumental variable approach.  When they run the traditional model without 
instruments, they get a large positive and statistically significant parameter estimate on contributions, as 
with previous studies.  However, when they use instrumentation and fixed effects procedures, the 
coefficient switches sign and is not statistically significant.  Thus, the increasingly prevalent view 
amongst academics is that campaign contributions do not buy votes (at least in the United States).
5 
If money does not buy votes, then why do firms contribute?  What does money buy?  The 
dominant view is that PAC money buys access—access to legislators’ staffs and to the legislator herself.  
A legislator’s time is valuable and the legislator must decide which firm representatives to meet with.  
One sorting mechanism, on the margin, is to use campaign contributions.  Indeed, Milyo (2002) has 
likened contributions to Christmas cards and fruit baskets.  When two hundred people want to meet with 
you, whom are you most likely to meet?  The person who has been sending you Christmas cards for years 
or the person who has not contacted you for years?   In Milyo’s paper, Christmas cards rule the day—not 
for corruptive reasons, but because they are a token of familiarity, friendship, and collegiality.  One of the 
most cited formal theoretical models of “access” is Austen-Smith (1995).  Empirical work on the access 
hypothesis has largely been in the form of case studies on particular issues, such as farming (Hansen 
1991) and trade (Schattschneider 1935).  These case studies have found substantial support for the access 
hypothesis.  Note, however, there has been a modicum of statistical work on the subject.  Once access is 
obtained, a firm lobbies—which is the subject of the next subsection of this paper. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, there is a growing literature on the value of political connections to a firm which this paper does not 
examine.  See (Faccio 2004, Fisman 2001, and Hillman et al 1999)  
5 One alternative hypothesis that has been proposed is that money does not buy a vote, but buys a legislator’s 
effort—that is, the legislator is being paid for exerting effort in looking after and/or passing a bill (Baron 1989, Hall 
and Wayman 1990)   7
2.  Information 
Lobbying is generally regarded as the act of an interest group providing information to a 
legislator and her staff through private or small meetings and communications.  Information is thought of 
broadly, to include facts, knowing or unknowing falsehoods, threats, commitments, or any other kind of 
oral or written message that can be transmitted.  Academically, lobbying is different from advertising and 
media campaigns which are very public and often are targeted not directly at the legislator, but rather at 
her constituents, who subsequently pressure the legislator to adopt a particular position.  It is important to 
note that no money changes hands in lobbying—only information.  In this sense, it is quite distinct from 
vote buying. 
The theoretical work on informational lobbying is vast.  The canonical model is a principal-agent 
model where the agent (in this case, the lobbyist) has better information about the effects of a policy or 
decision than the principal (in this case, the legislator).  The lobbyist has private information about the 
impact of policy, the preferences of constituents, and the technical aspects of policy implementation.  The 
legislator wishes to extract the information so as to make good decisions that will lead to re-election 
and/or personal ideological congruence.  However, the lobbyist is biased and therefore has an incentive to 
provide biased information to the principal that will result in a favorable policy outcome for the agent.    
At its broadest level, theoretical papers that consider asymmetric information can be classified 
into two branches—information that is verifiable ex post by the principal and information that is not 
verifiable by the principal.  If information is verifiable, then the principal receives information, checks it 
(or threatens to check it), and then makes policy decisions.  A number of models have been constructed 
with these features, varying the assumptions of preferences and the cost of information verification (de 
Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbitztondo 1999, Epstein and O’Halloran 1994, and Austen-Smith 1993).  An 
often cited model is Austen-Smith and Wright’s (1992, 1994) model of counteractive lobbying.  In this 
model, two interest groups choose simultaneously whether to invest in data collection at exogenous cost.  
After making this investment and discovering the true state of the world, each group simultaneously 
decides whether and which legislators to lobby—friends or enemies.  The model demonstrates groups   8
focus their lobbying on those legislators who are on marginally on the opposite side of the issue from the 
interest group to try to convince them to switch their votes.  An interest group, however, does lobby its 
allies in order to “counteract” the lobbying of the opponent interest group.  Thus, counteractive lobbying 
occurs.
 6   
When information is not verifiable, two types of models are usually employed:  where 
information is costless to acquire and transmit to the principal and where information is costly to acquire 
and transmit.  The former category of models, costless information acquisition and transmission, are 
generally considered “cheap talk” models.  The agent transmits a message to a principal and the principal 
must assess whether there is any useful information in the message. Although one might believe that such 
kind of messages are just “hot air” or “cheap talk,” Crawford and Sobel (1982) have shown that if the 
preferences of the principal and agent are sufficiently close, cheap talk can be informative.  Since this 
paper was published, there have been literally thousands of cheap talk models written.  One of the most 
influential recent papers in the area (Battagalini 2002) shows that if there are two orthogonal dimensions 
to policy outcomes (e.g. Medicare eligibility and Medicare reimbursement rates) and two interest groups 
(American Hospital Association and American Association of Retired Persons), truthful information 
revelation can occur.  This paper has spawned a renaissance in the cheap talk literature (see Ambrus and 
Takahashi 2008 for an overview). 
A second type of model assumes information is not verifiable but is costly to acquire and/or 
transmit.  Information may be costly to acquire and transmit because the interest group has to put people 
on the ground, conduct surveys, have meetings, or poll citizens, to name just a few instances of expense.  
Costly information can have two characteristics—the costs can be exogenously determined or 
endogenously determined.  Exogenous costs means there is a fixed fee for interest groups to acquire and 
transmit information.  These exogenous costs are like participation fees to lobby—exogenously 
determined fees.  Information is transmitted in two main ways in these models.  First the observable 
decision of the interest group whether or not to pay the fee gives the legislator information about the ex 
                                                 
6 There are also models where two biased interest groups invest in obtaining information, but once that information   9
ante probability distribution of a favorable outcome for the interest group.  A second source of 
information in these models is the decision of the firm to send a message.  These models (Lohmann 1993, 
Grossman and Helpman 2001, and Bennedsen and Feldman 2002) are attractive when the cost to collect 
or transmit information is a discrete price. 
Frequently, however, the firm decides precisely how much money to invest in information 
collection and transmission.  When the firm can choose how much to spend, the information acquisition 
and lobbying expenditures are endogenously determined.  Endogenous cost lobbying models are often 
called “money burning” models and frequently have signaling properties—that is the amount the interest 
group invests in lobbying signals something about the veracity of the information.  The challenge for the 
principal in these models is to establish a lobbying schedule so that the principal obtains truthful 
information revelation about the state of the world from the interest group (Grossman-Helpman 2001, 
Potters Van Widen 1992).  Under a schedule that induces truthful information revelation, the interest 
group must spend more money the farther away are its policy preferences relative to the legislator.   
What is striking about the literature on lobbying is that there is extremely limited empirical work 
linking the theory to data.  The first and most prevalent approach of statistical empirical work describes 
how much firms lobby and how they lobby (e.g. Schuler 1996, Schuler et al 2002, Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998, Leech et al 2005, de Figueiredo 2004).  Many, but not all, of these papers rely on data from 
the federal lobbying disclosure reports mandated in the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act.  A second 
category of papers attempt to quantify the effect of lobbying on policy outcomes (de Figueiredo and 
Silverman 2006, Hedge and Mowery 2008).  Finally, there are two papers that attempt to actually test the 
implications of lobbying models by closely linking formal theory to data analysis.  The first is the 
aforementioned paper (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994) which examines the counteractive lobbying 
hypothesis using data from the battle over the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork in 1987, while 
the second paper uses state level lobbying data to examine the Grossman-Helpman endogenous cost 
lobbying models (de Figueiredo and Cameron 2008).  Both papers find substantial support for these two 
                                                                                                                                                             
is collected, it enters the public domain.  See, for example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).   10
models in the data. 
The area of corporate influence on legislation—whether through contributions, access, or 
information—has led to advances by economists and political scientists in understanding how interest 
groups and firms affect policy.  This said, corporate influence is not only exercised over legislators.  
Administrative agencies are another area in which non-market strategy can be effective.  The next section 
addresses this area. 
 
2.  Administrative Agencies 
Because of the breadth of areas over which legislators must consider laws, it is difficult for a 
single elected body to oversee the details, implementation, and monitoring of the legislation.  Elected 
officials simply do not have the time nor the expertise to engage in all of these activities.  Therefore, 
legislatures delegate these tasks to administrative agencies—or the bureaucracy. 
Generally, there are two types of bureaucratic agencies—executive agencies and independent 
agencies.  Executive agencies, such the Department of Housing and Urban Development, report to the 
executive branch of the government.  Independent agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, have a governing board or commission 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but do not report to the President.  They are 
technically independent from elected government, though both the legislature and the executive attempt to 
influence the agency through funding, influence, public opinion, and various forms of oversight. 
Because the legislature delegates the details to the agency, the agency can have substantial power 
in determining the implementation of the laws.  The agency is headed by appointees, but it is staffed with 
civil service employees who have dedicated their lives to understanding the industry, issue, or area.  It is 
often believed that agencies are more expert, cautious, and long-term policy-sensitive than the legislature.   
With this structure, firms have a second opportunity of influencing the contours of agency 
regulations.  As in the legislature, there are two potential ways in which firms influence outcomes in the 
agencies themselves:  through money and through information.  As before, the transfer of money from an   11
interest group to a regulator to influence policy outcomes is generally considered a bribe and, therefore, is 
outside the analysis of this paper. 
However, information transmission between a firm and agency is not only perfectly legal but 
actually encouraged to enhance the agency decision-making process.  The European Commission, for 
example, relies upon the substantial amount of information flow from firms for better policy 
implementation.  The staffs of agencies are limited, and they do not have the requisite manpower or 
resources to effectively generate the necessary quantity or quality of information for good policymaking.  
Just as the interest groups possess more information than legislators, the interest groups also possess more 
information than the agency (though the information asymmetry may not be as acute as with legislatures).   
In the same way that asymmetric information models are applied to legislatures, they are applied 
to agencies.  However, in this case, the administrative agency is the principal and the interest group is 
agent.  As before, both have biases and the interest group provides information to the regulator.  The 
details of these models need not be repeated here as their effects are the same.
7   
Empirically, there has been an enormous amount written on how interest groups affect agency 
outcomes.  Most of the literature is contained in discursive books that describe (in great detail) individual 
agencies, their decision-making processes, and the role of interest groups (e.g. Carpenter 2010, Hansen 
1991, Stone 1991).  Outside of the limited statistical analyses found in these more discursive books, there 
are a handful of statistical studies of lobbying in agencies.  This handful of studies has focused on the 
amount of lobbying and the organization of lobbying, and has largely not considered the effect of 
lobbying on agency outcomes (de Figueiredo and Tiller 2001, de Figueiredo and Kim 2004). 
 
3.  Courts 
                                                 
7 One area of difference is exactly what agencies maximize.  While most academics agree that elected politicians 
maximize some mix of re-election potential, promotion to higher office potential, and ideology, it is unclear exactly 
what agencies maximize—social welfare, promotion to higher office, ideology, and status are all considered in the 
regulator’s utility function to some extent.  Spiller (1990) has argued that regulators also maximize their private 
sector job prospects after governmental employment.   12
In many countries, an agency’s decision is subject to judicial review.  In the United States, the 
Administrative Procedures Act and the agency’s enabling statute outlines the ways in which an agency 
ruling may be challenged in court.  The rule-making could be arbitrary and capricious, the agency may 
not have jurisdiction on the issue, or the agency may have not followed proper procedures in creating its 
rules.  The arbiters of a legal challenge to an administrative agency rule are judges—judges who are 
political actors and tend to render decisions in accordance with their own preferences (see, e.g. Segal and 
Spaeth 1993, Segal 1997, Spiller and Gely 1992; Spiller and Spitzer 1992; Cohen and Spitzer 1994; Tiller 
1996; Tiller and Spiller 1999; Marks 1988; McCubbins et al 1994, 1997; Cross and Tiller 1998; Epstein 
and Knight 1995; de Figueiredo 2005; Revesz 1997: Cross and Tiller 1999, Martin and Quinn 2002, de 
Figueiredo and Tiller 1996, de Figueiredo et al 2001).
8  For example, conservative judges may be more 
pro-business, anti-regulation, or strong property rights than liberal judges.  These judge sit in a hierarchy 
with lower level district judges, middle level appellate judges, and high level Supreme Court justices. 
As with agencies, it is generally illegal for members of the appointed judiciary to accept money 
from litigants.
9  However, judges can accept information.  The theoretical models on the subject largely 
assume that information is well known and that the judge is exerting effort to protect her decision from 
override from a higher judicial authority.  Empirical models on the subject find similar results.  The 
above-mentioned papers cover these topics in some detail. 
What is missing from this literature is the injection of interest groups.  A small number of papers 
have attempted to examine the role of litigants in government litigation.  These largely empirical papers 
find that resource-intensive groups appear to have the advantage in lower courts.  Olson (1990), for 
example, finds that empirically, large groups can use federal district courts to “enforce gains” won in 
other fora. Similarly, Songer and Sheehan (1992) find that in the United States Courts of Appeals 
“upperdog litigants win much more frequently.” Overall, though, outside of the legal literature, there has 
been little work done on role of litigants and the government in corporate political strategy. 
                                                 
8 There is a literature emanating from Law and Economics assuming that judges “find the truth.”  These papers, 
however, model civil litigation where one firm sues another.  For a literature review of this literature, see Hay and 
Spier (2004).    13
 
IV. Integration of the Venues 
The legislative aspects to this field of study came to be known as “Pivotal Politics” (Krehbiel 
1998).  The general structure of these models is well-defined decision-maker preferences, a clear 
sequence of moves amongst actors, a well-specified policy-space, and a clear set of rules by which one 
actor can select or overturn policy.  Taken together, these will create pivot points which will determine 
each actor’s discretion and the final win set for policy.   
With these building blocks, scholars turned their efforts to understanding how institutions interact 
with each other.  This literature began with explaining how institutions, as strategic actors, created and 
protected the policies they generated (in the absence of interest groups).  The first papers in this area 
explored the relationship between legislatures and agencies. Marks (1988) and McNollgast (1989) 
developed a set of spatial preference models where a legislature (principal) delegated the implementation 
of policy to an agency (agent) with different preferences for policy outcomes.  As in most principal-agent 
models, costly monitoring by the principal leads to an equilibrium where the agent has some discretion in 
decision-making.  The principal is required to make trade-offs in investing in monitoring versus discretion 
by the agency.  A steady stream of models in this area explains the details of this principal-agent 
relationship (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, McNollgast 1989, Banks and Weingast 1992, Ferejohn and 
Shipan 1989).  These legislature-agency models were then followed quickly by legislature-court and 
agency-court models with the same principal agent flavor—the principal attempting to secure its policy 
preferences by monitoring the agent while the agent attempts to exercise discretion in the presence of 
costly monitoring.  (Spiller 1992, Spiller and Spitzer 1992, McNollgast 1994, Tiller 1998, Tiller and 
Spiller 1999, Canes-Wrone 2003, Eskridge 1991).   
It is within this context that recent work has begun to insert interest groups and firms into the 
mix.  In the first set of papers, the interest groups have private information, and this private information is 
passed on to a given institution (agency) who then bargains with other institutions (legislature).  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Klerman (2007) notes an exception to this case in England in the 1800s where judges received fees from plaintiffs!   14
tension occurs in these models because of the information advantage the interest group has over the 
agency and the agency has over the legislature.  In all of these papers, information is assumed to be 
verifiable ex post (de Figueiredo, Spiller, Urbitztondo 1999, Epstein and OHalloran 1995, Boehmke et al 
2006).  Additional models introduced courts into the multi-institutional mix (Rubin, Curran and Curran 
1999, Caldeira and Wright 1998, McGuire and Caldeira 1993, Olson 1990). 
A second set of papers loosens the constraint that the firm can affect only one venue.  Rather, the 
firm chooses which institution to influence, and then the institutions play a principal-agent game.  
Advances along these lines are in their infancy at best..  The most recent scholarship in multi-institution 
games with interest groups that try to influence multiple venues relies largely on vote-buying models.  De 
Figueiredo and de Figueiredo (2002) examine how policy is changed in a vote-buying model when the 
interest group can choose to invest in influencing a regulator or save its money and invest in building a 
better court case against the agency.  Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2004) also build a vote-buying model 
that allows the firm to influence policy outcomes by either bribing politicians or bribing regulators.   
Despite the fact that it well-known that interest groups endogenously choose venues to lobby, there are, to 
date, no papers of which I am aware that incorporate a multi-institution model with non-verifiable 
information and endogenous choice of venue by interest group. 
 
V.  Research Questions 
So where do we go from here?  Four areas seem to have the prospect for scholars to create a 
sustainable research agenda.
10  First, there is a need for better theories of how interest group behavior in 
multiple institutions affects policy outcomes.  Figure 2 illustrates this opening.  The first dimension of the 
table shows the institutional breadth of formal theoretical and empirical work to date.  The second 
dimension examines whether the theoretical and empirical models explore money or information.  What 
is evident from the table is that informational models that include multiple institutions and interest groups 
are both lacking from a theoretical perspective and empirical perspective.  (In addition, there is no   15
empirical work on vote-buying models that examines multiple institutions and interest groups with venue 
choice.)  There are at least two obvious ways to explore this question.  The first is to model the 
interactions between two competing interest groups.  The second is to exploit endogenous cost lobbying 
models that allow interest groups to choose their level and mix of lobbying expenditures across venues.   
A second opening for research is to seriously test theoretical models.  This pursuit could follow 
one of two paths.  The first path is to develop new theoretical features in a discursive model that takes 
seriously the multi-institutional approach that interest groups pursue.  From this framework, one would 
develop testable implications for which new datasets could be used.  A second path is to take the current 
theoretical models, develop testable implications, and bring data and solid empirical methods to the 
endeavor.  This might involve simplifying the current formal models so that they can be tested, or 
developing additional mathematical apparatus so as to conform to the general structure of the data 
available.  I discuss this first path further in the next section with the sketch of a discursive model that 
could be the departure point for such a project.   
The third avenue for research is improving empirical measures and data.  There is a trend in 
management strategy, economics, and political science away from traditional datasets and toward more 
creative datasets.  For example, the data from the federal government or states on political contributions 
or the lobbying expenditure data from the federal Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 are now considered 
common sources of data.  The researcher who is to make an impact must discover and develop 
alternative sources of data.  For example, datasets on firm bureaucratic lobbying can now be created 
from federal agencies’ disclosure reports.  In addition, states keep a variety of data on lobbying and 
information disclosure that can be a useful source for empirical work (Gray et al 2002, de Figueiredo 
2004, de Figueiredo and Cameron 2008). 
Another possibility in data development is to integrate different datasets that proxy for political 
action across multiple venues.  For example, the data from the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 
quantifies corporate lobbying in legislatures.  Comments and ex parte contacts by firms in federal 
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agencies quantify lobbying by these same firms in the bureaucracy.  Finally, the PACER database 
quantifies the degree of information being transmitted to courts through filings of briefs and motions.  
Some of these datasets are not only novel and innovative, but integrating these datasets will allow the 
researcher to test hypotheses about lobbying across multiple institutions.  In addition, one should look 
for natural experiments or exogenous variation in data.  States and countries vary in their rules, their 
structures, and their financing—all leading to sources of variation that can be exploited by researchers. 
The final area for research and perhaps the area where promising young researchers can make the 
biggest impact in corporate political strategy is linking firm corporate political strategy to policy 
outcomes to firm market performance.  Researchers have largely been content to date to link the first two 
areas or the second two areas.  However, I am aware of only one theoretical paper and no empirical work 
that integrates all three areas (Baron 1999).  This is truly a promising area of research.  The challenge to 
overcome in pursuing this research is controlling for the endogeneity of right hand side variables 
throughout potential empirical tests. 
 
VI.  Outline of a Theory 
  In this section I attempt to outline a theoretical construct for multiple venue lobbying that might 
serve as the basis for the second area for research.  This is very preliminary, but it could be a useful guide 
for thinking about these issues. 
  We begin the analysis with an understanding of veto points or pivotal players (Cameron 2002, 
Krehbiel 1998).  In the federal government and all state governments, except Nebraska, a House and a 
Senate, and an executive (the president or the governor) must each approve any new legislation.
 
In 
addition, within the House and Senate, there are multiple veto points in the form of committees—
substantive area committees (e.g. Commerce), procedural committees (e.g. Rules), and conference 
committees (Weingast and Marshall 1988, Shepsle and Weingast 1987) which all have substantial power.  
Thus, in creating legislation, there are many veto points that must be overcome. 
Inside of regulatory agencies, there also exist veto points or points of substantial influence. There   17
are three main levels of decision-making within agencies (de Figueiredo and Kim 2004).  The first level is 
comprised of the civil servants who are able to influence (though not veto) the ultimate rule that is passed 
through agenda-setting, delay, and recommendations.  For instance, in pharmaceutical drugs, it is known 
that Food and Drug Administration employees tend to slow the approval process of a company’s drug if 
that company engages in conduct of which the FDA disapproves. With a blockbuster drug generating one 
million dollars in revenue each day it is on the market, even one week of delay can be extremely costly to 
the company (Economist 1998).  The second level in the agency is comprised of the personal staffs of the 
political appointees. These individuals influence the outcome through control of access to and advising of 
the commissioners.  Like the civil servants, these staffers have no veto, but they do have influence.   The 
final level is the political appointee, known as a commissioner or agency head, who is the ultimate policy-
maker in administrative agencies. The commissioner(s) has the power to create rules; she retains the true 
veto power.  
Finally, judges who preside over courts and have preferences over policy will arbitrate the law in 
such a way to conform to their ideologies.  In all, the judicial branch has between one and three veto 
points within it (depending upon the type of case)—the district court judge, the appellate court 3-judge 
panel, and the Supreme Court.  From a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court will rarely hear cases, as 
less than 100 cases annually are granted cert by the Court.  
We can now define three regularities about the probability of a firm obtaining favorable policy.  
First, with this policy-making process, certain institutions are more receptive to policy change than others, 
holding all else constant.  Obtaining statutes to change policy can be difficult because of the number of 
hurdles that must be overcome; for the same reason, courts are a place where favorable policy is easier to 
obtain; agencies are in the intermediate range. 
Second, because policy pursuit in multiple fora is not a mutually exclusive activity, a probability 
enhancing strategy can be to pursue policy in multiple fora.  We can characterize the probability of this 
outcome using Bayes Rule:    
   18
P(L u R u C) = P(L) + P(R) + P(C) – P(RL) – P(CR) – P(LC) – P(LRC) 
 
where P(L) is the probability of passing new policy in the legislature, P(R) is the probability of passing 
policy in the agency, and P(C) is the probability of passing new policy in the court.  Note, with such a 
characterization of the multiple forum strategy, we know that the probability of obtaining the policy in 
any one institution sets a lower bound on the probability of obtain policy in multiple forums.  In fact, this 
formula will allow us to consider the range of possibilities. Assume there is a 0.8 probaility of getting 
policy through any one veto gate within an institution. If a firm is willing to accept policy generation from 
any one institution, then a multiple forum lobbying effort will yield a 87% chance of obtaining favorable 
policy.  If on the other hand, a firm seeks policy of the most durable form, where all three institutions 
must vote or decide in the affirmative to a policy change, then the probability of success for the firm is 
only 8.5%, despite the very favorable odds of getting through any one veto gate.  
A final item to note is the differential probabilities of success in playing offense v. playing 
defense. Playing “tough” offense (attempting to make it through all the veto points) is inherently a more 
difficult job that playing defense.  Because the probability of being successful in a defensive posture is the 
complement of being successful in an offensive posture, one need only to stop the policy at any one veto 
point to stop the policy altogether.  Thus, it is not surprising that the status quo tends to be very sticky and 
changes to the status quo fleeting. 
If the probability of obtaining policy can differ so much across institutions, then why would a 
firm ever seek policy through an institution where the probability of a favorable outcome is low?  The 
answer lies in the durability and scope of the outcome. When Congress creates policy it has nationwide 
jurisdiction and enforcement.  While agencies can influence the shape of legislation, they cannot overturn 
it; courts also have an ability to overturn legislation, but only on constitutional grounds.  Given the 
number of veto points within Congress, it is not easy to change a given law.  This suggests that there is a 
wide scope and good amount of durability in congressional legislation. 
Agencies also create rules that can have national, regional, or firm-specific impact.  Unlike   19
Congress, administrative agencies can be subjected to review and change, by the Executive, the Congress, 
and the Courts (Weingast and Moran, 1983).  The durability of these agency rules is questionable, 
however, because they can be changed relatively quickly, without alterations in the wording of the 
governing statute or the procedures of the agency. For example, the Carter Administration, through the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), promulgated a new regulation that permitted the non-
directive counseling of pregnant women at federally-funded health clinics in their various health options, 
including abortion. After the Reagan Administration took office, HHS imposed a restriction on federally 
funded counseling that made it illegal for counselors to mention abortion as a health or family planning 
option for these same pregnant women.  In February 1993, shortly after President Clinton took office, an 
interim rule took effect that restored the ability of counselors at federally-funded facilities to discuss all 
options related to a woman’s pregnancy, including abortion (explicitly). All of this occurred without 
changes to statute. Thus, while agency rule-making has the force of law, the durability of agency 
rulemaking is subjected to outside actors, such as the president, who have little oversight and can change 
policy at a whim.   
Finally, courts “create” policy through judicial rulings.  Depending on the level of the court and 
its jurisdiction, the scope of the ruling will usually have force over narrow geographical boundaries and 
over a specific case or set of cases. One important aspect to courts, though, is that because the judiciary 
adheres to common law and doctrinal principles, judges have few checks and balances to monitor their 
behavior and insure adherence to stare decisis.  In essence, judges can claim that the current case is 
“unique” in many respects, and that general principles of law do not hold in this particular case, and 
therefore rule however they wish (Tiller and Spiller 1999).  In this sense, judicial precedent is perhaps the 
least durable aspect to economic rulemaking.   
We can now begin to understand the institutions of economic regulation.  Each institution has a 
different number of veto points, or cost, of obtaining policy.  Each institution has a different scope of its 
rulemaking.  And each institution has a different durability of policy enacted.  
Figure 3 summarizes our discussion to this point and outlines the probability, cost, scope, and   20
durability of policy enacted by each of these institutions.  What becomes clear is that there are trade-offs 
in seeking policy in different institutions.
   
 
***INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE***  
 
To this point we have established two main principles of political institutions.  First, there are 
multiple institutions that can create policy, and these institutions move, to a first approximation, 
sequentially.  Second, the probability, cost, scope, and durability of policy enactment differ substantially 
across these institutions.  With these two principles, we can examine how firms attempt to influence 
policy outcomes to their advantage.  
To derive a set of testable hypotheses, let us begin by deriving a set of predictions directly related 
to the institutions.  The above discussion and Figure 3 suggests that offensive lobbying strategies can be 
characterized as follows: 
 
H1a: Holding all else constant, offensive interest groups will pursue their interests in more policy-durable 
institutions.  
 
H1b: Holding all else constant, offensive interest groups will be less likely to pursue their 
interests the greater the number of veto points in the institution.  
 
 
Defensive interest groups also behave strategically (de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo, 2002). They 
recognize that they have better prospects of defending the status quo in institutions with more veto points.  
This is attractive because they may not have to expend many resources to defend the status quo at only 
one point, or if they do, they can target all of their resources at a single veto point (Groseclose and 
Snyder, 1996). But sometimes, even defense is elusive.  If ideology and sentiments run strong in 
Congress, it may be difficult to slow the process of policy-making there. One strategy defensive firms can 
employ, though, is to support a version of the new policy in a different, less policy-durable institution.
11 
This occurs because the defense, recognizing the policy may pass in a very durable form (in Congress), 
chooses to concede the policy temporarily, but seeks an institution where the policy implementation will   21
be less durable.  The lower durability gives the defensive interest group an opportunity to change or 
circumvent the policy in the future.  
For example, suppose the Sierra Club wishes to prevent an environmentally lax law from taking 
effect. Seeing that it is the predisposition of Congress to pass such a law, the Sierra Club will go to the 
EPA and declare it will not challenge the relaxation of pollution emission standards. In doing this, 
industry obtains its policy goal, at least temporarily, and the Sierra Club obtains low policy durability to 
challenge another day. 
  
The question then arises as to why industry does not convince Congress to pass 
the law as well. In fact, the actions of the EPA lowers the incentive of Congress to engage in the costly 
act of legislating. We see this behavior repeatedly in the regulation of business.  This leads us to our 
second hypothesis:  
 
H2: The higher the probability of passage of a rule in a policy-durable institution, the more likely 
opposing (defensive) interest groups will not oppose the same or a more diluted policy position in 
policy non-durable institutions to disincentivize the policy-durable institution from acting.  
 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 assume that groups must choose between institutions for policy creation. In 
fact, there are cases when political action is actually complementary.  That is, corporate political activity 
in Congress actually enhances the value of lobbying at the agency. Congress applies pressure to the 
agency, in the form of hearings, oversight, and funding, to encourage it to act in a certain way, as it did 
the initial UPS example. This congressional lobbying by firms catalyzing this pressure actually enhances 
the value of that firm’s lobbying at the agency.  Likewise, lobbying the agency with excellent information 
may enhance the value of litigation effort, as the court relies on the factual record from the agency 
proceedings to guide the court’s decision-making (Strauss et al 1995). Thus, in the presence of 
complementarity, we expect corporate political activity to increase in multiple forums.   
 
H4: As the complementarity of political effort across institutions increases, the breadth of 
political effort across institutions will increase.  
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We can develop an even more robust theory of corporate political activity by considering 
how policy characteristics will affect the market activity of firms.  For example, consider the result 
of policy on corporate investment.  The imputed risk-adjusted return on investment decreases as the 
uncertainty increases. In particular, if a policy is delivered that can be easily overturned, then the 
risk level of the firm’s investment increases because the asset may have much lower value in the 
new environment.  Thus, durable policies convey an advantage to investment because of their 
certainty and lack of flexibility.  Nondurable policy, on the other hand, leaves the long-term much 
more opaque.  This, in turn, has an impact on investment.  
 
H5: Policies passed by non-durable policy institutions will result in less long-term investment than the 
same policies passed by policy-durable institutions.  
 
 
While the theory to this point has included all the major political institutions and interest groups, 
it has tended to be U.S.-centric.  However, the framework introduced in this paper is, with modification, 
actually more generalizable.  One of the most obvious differences across countries is the design of the 
legislature—presidential v. parliamentary systems.  There are many forms of parliamentary system, but in 
some respects they possess a number of common aspects:  the ruling party is the one (or coalition) with 
the most seats in the legislature; there is no independent executive branch; there is a vote of confidence 
procedure to determine the potential for early elections; administrative agencies often wield limited 
power; courts deal primarily in issues of private law rather than public law.  
What is interesting about parliamentary systems is that policies passed within a government’s 
time in office tend to have high durability.  However, policies can be quickly reversed at the change of a 
government because the government acts, to a rough approximation, as a unitary actor.  This then means 
that parliamentary systems have strong short-term durability but have much lower long-term durability 
compared to presidential systems. With this as background, hypotheses can be generated for different 
types of parliamentary systems.  Once we can characterize the institutions and sequence of play, veto 
points, policy-durability, and policy scope of an institution, firm behavior can be articulated.
 
   23
 
VII. Concluding Thoughts 
Non-market strategy is now a well-established field in strategic management.  It covers many 
topics including international institutions, political institutions, the media, activism, corporate social 
responsibility and sustainability, ethics, and market failures.  In the subfield of corporate political 
strategy, substantial advances have been made by economists, political scientists, and management 
scholars.  This said, there are a number of openings in the literature that will yield fruitful long-term 
research agendas.  In particular, linking theory to data more tightly, developing multi-forum theories of 
political action, and linking, in a rigorous way, non-market strategies to policy outcomes to market 
performance, will likely prove to be where the next major advances in the field are.  Scholars will do well 
to focus their efforts on these high profile topics. 
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